Unclassified Paper

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.

The Operations Transition Planning Cell: Organizing and Tooling for <u>Termination Success</u>

by

John R. Boule'

MAJ USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

2 February 2001

Professor Elizabeth McIntyre

Advisor

Professor David Goodrich CMDR Steve Kenny, RN Moderators, Seminar 16

UNCLASSIFI Security Classificati	ion This Page	DOCUMENTATION PAGE	
1. Report Se unity (
2. Security Classif			
3. Declassification,		le:	and the second s
4. Distribution/Ava			A: APPROVED FOR IBUTION IS UNLIMITED.
5. Name of Performing	ng Organization: JO	INT MILITARY OPERATIONS D	EPARTMENT
6. Office Symbol:	С	7. Address: NAVAL WAR CO 686 CUSHING NEWPORT, RI	ROAD
8. Title (Include Secu	rity Classification):		
The Operations Tran	sition Planning Cel -T	1: Organizing and Tooling Unclassified-	for Termination Success
9. Personal Authors	: MAJ John R. Boule	, USA	
10.Type of Report:	FINAL	11. Date of Report: 5 Fe	bruary 2001
12.Page Count: 23 (incl Notes and Bibl	iography) Abusar! PROF	= McIntyRE
satisfaction of th reflect my own per Department of the	e requirements of t sonal views and are Navy.	ubmitted to the Faculty o he JMO Department. The c not necessarily endorsed	ontents of this paper by the NWC or the
interagency; delibe Directorate; desire staff	rate planning; tran d end state; instru	<pre>paper: conflict resolutio sition operations; Strate ments of power; joint doc</pre>	gic Planning trine; geographic CINCs
Armed Forces have by years, the U.S. has truggle is a result after the application organization and a achievement of US seach geograph in his Strategic Plagencies as the Depfor International Deshould be well verseconomic instrument in planning. The focus of this interagency plans the seach geograph in his Strategic Plagencies as the Depfor International Deshould be well verseconomic instrument in planning.	ecome the dominant s struggled in the t of transition from on of military forestermination planning trategic objectives in CINC should have anning Directorate for the state, of the state, of the state of the applications of the state of th	ng doctrine will facilitate. E a standing interagency to (J-5). The cell should in Central Intelligence Agence Department of Commerce. Lon of military, diplomating as well as in the interation on the roles, responsibility.	ion. Much of this k to diplomatic control nteragency planning e the enduring ransition planning team clude members from such y, United States Agency These representatives c, informational and ction of these elements ities and make-up of the Operations Transition
Planning Cell (OTPC most significant ta	 The OTPC has n 	many assignments. The par so discusses ideas for imp	er discusses six of the
16.Distribution / Availability of	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
Abstract:		ASSIFIED	
17.Abstract Security			IC DEDARTMENT
18.Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19.Telephone: 841-6461		20.Office Symbol: C	

19.Telephone: 841-6461

Table of Contents

<u>Section</u> <u>Page</u>	<u>Number</u>	
I. INTRODUCTION	1	
New Transition Mindset Needed	2	
Planning a Skillful Transition	3	
II. TERMINATION: STATE OF THE ART	3	
Termination Doctrine in Our Joint Pubs		
Termination Considerations in Operational Art	6	
Termination Shortfalls	6	
III. OPERATIONS TRANSITION PLANNING CELL (OTPC)	7	
OTPC Tasks	8	
 Assisting with Desired End State Definition 	8	
Defining Military Transition Conditions	8	
Sequencing	8	
 Monitoring, Assessing and Recommending Changes to Strateg 	y 9	
Developing Contingencies	10	
• Leading the Transition	10	
OTPC Organization	10	
OTPC Membership		
OTPC Implementation		
Counterarguments	16	
IV. CONCLUSION	17	

I. INTRODUCTION

Thus it can happen that military men, while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated maneuvers, remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plans serve the nation's interests. --Fred Ikle'

As operations over the last twelve years have shown, the United States Armed Forces have become the dominant military force on earth. All services, operating in joint and combined environments, have proven themselves capable policy instruments. Where the U.S. has struggled, however, is in the area of conflict termination. Since World War II, the U.S. has often prevailed militarily, but frequently failed to achieve policy goals. Examples of these termination failures include Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Somalia and the Balkans.

Moreover, World War II was a war termination anomaly. How often in the future will the U.S. fight a war with the stated objective of the enemy's unconditional surrender? The prospect is unlikely. Senior military leaders must be prepared to fight highly constrained limited wars and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) with plans that focus not just on military success but also on winning the peace.

As leaders assess the condition and direction of the U.S. military, an opportunity now exists to take a long, hard look at conflict termination planning. A quick scan of the Joint Pubs gives the military professional the sense that the culture whole-heartily buys into the importance of conflict termination strategy, but the literature offers little help on designing such a strategy. It is time to take the next step. This step is creating an interagency organization and a doctrine that arms this organization with the tools to do termination planning.

New Transition Mindset Needed

Military-dominant operations are but finite points in the long continuum defining U.S. relationships with foreign states. Our interactions with other nations are predominantly defined by diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of national power. To reinforce the transient nature of conflict as the dominant instrument of power, the U.S. military should clearly subordinate consideration of "termination" and "military end state" to the study of "transition" and "transition state" in our doctrine.

When the President decides to use military force, the military mindset is deploy, expeditiously conduct business, then rapidly exit. The consequence of a quick military departure is often diplomatic chiefs taking over U.S. leadership of a crisis without thorough deliberation with military leaders. Intense coordination generally occurs only at the beginning and end of a military operation. History has shown that the military's hasty exit leads to continuity breaks and detracts from our ability to successfully shape the environment for winning the peace and achieving the desired end state.

The application of militarily force is designed to set the conditions for the successful use of the political (a.k.a. diplomatic), economic and informational (a.k.a. psychological) instruments of power to achieve national objectives.² These non-military forms of power are present during hostilities, but ordinarily play supporting roles. However, conflict has such a dramatic impact on U.S.-foreign state relations, ensuring its constrained, correctly-focused use is paramount to successfully applying the other instruments of power to achieve policy goals after the military's role has diminished.

Achievement of strategic objectives is facilitated by the proper hand-off of U.S. leadership to diplomats after acceptable military transition conditions have been met. Interagency coordination

throughout military operations is the linchpin to this successful transition.³ The planning approach should not be aimed toward military termination, but directed toward setting the stage for continued, successful U.S. interaction by other means. Our culture is too oriented on the military finish line and must think more about how the military leg of the race can best contribute to achieving national goals.

Planning a Skillful Transition

Each regional CINC should have a standing interagency transition planning team. The cell should include members well versed in the application of military, diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power as well as in the interaction of these elements. The focus of this paper will be on the roles, responsibilities and make-up of this interagency planning team. I have named the planning team the Operations Transition Planning Cell (OTPC).

To reinforce the need for developing an OTPC with accompanying doctrine, I will first identify existing doctrinal shortfalls. Next, I will recommend how the OTPC should be organized and manned to eliminate these deficiencies. I will also describe the tasks the OTPC should accomplish to ensure a better transition. Keep in mind the aim of the OTPC is to assist the CINC in securing U.S. strategic objectives. To perform this function, the OTPC needs adapted and newly developed tools. Unfortunately, due to space constraints, I am unable to discuss needed techniques in detail, but will provide some ideas for further study.

II. TERMINATION: STATE OF THE ART

Termination Doctrine in Our Joint Pubs

Our current operational doctrines display a serious blind spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination...⁴

This remark made by author James Reed describes the state of conflict termination study in the U.S. military in the Cold War. To be fair, military operations since the Cold War coupled with U.S. engagement-centered foreign policy, have resulted in some deliberate study of conflict termination among American military professionals. Our joint publications library contains hard evidence of this positive trend.

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, provides ample proof of the importance the U.S. military attaches to termination doctrine. Termination is emphasized throughout the manual with the most extensive discussions appearing in Chapters I and III. In a section entitled, "The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination," there is a discussion of developing properly conceived conflict termination criteria as a key to lasting victory. The doctrine in this section further states that conflict termination is an essential link between national strategy and posthostility aims.⁵

The discussion in Chapter III of Joint Pub 3.0 contains valuable planning guidance. The section on "Combatant Command Strategic Planning" defines desired end state and discusses the military conditions that help shape this state. The section continues with guidance for the combatant commander that tells him he may be required to support non-military instruments of power.⁶

Defining the military transition conditions is one of the critical *first* steps in the estimate and planning process. Also the pub correctly states that military victory is measured by how it supports attainment of the overall political goals.⁷

Joint Pub 3-0 provides ample evidence of answering the "what," "when" and "why" of conflict termination planning. It is clear from the manual that the CINC is responsible for incorporating conflict termination into his campaign planning early-on and in a manner consistent with national goals. It is also evident that the U.S. believes that military success is measured by the ability to achieve desired political objectives.

As Joint Pub 3-0 contains an introduction to termination planning, one might expect to find detailed guidance in Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The authors of Joint Pub 5-0 did not devote much space to termination planning. Termination and transition are mentioned less than a dozen times in the entire 100 page manual!⁸ This fact illuminates the absence of techniques and practices for successful transition planning in joint doctrine.

The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia is the only other good doctrinal source for further study on U.S. military conflict termination philosophy. The encyclopedia contains six pages devoted to termination. Some of the ideas are a repeat of Joint Pub 3-0, but new information about "when" to terminate, and some further discussion about termination applied to MOOTW situations, is contained in this reference. In addition, the photo of General Schwarzkopf discussing Desert Storm termination conditions with Iraqi leaders appears here. The photo seems to signal that regional CINCs must not only plan for successful termination, but should also be prepared to conduct negotiations personally. At the very least, a CINC needs to be able to provide negotiators with a list of military requirements that must be negotiated to create the military conditions which will set the stage for a successful transition. Such a list can be critical when the President halts military operations before these conditions are achieved on the ground, a situation General Schwarzkopf faced personally (and unfortunately had no such list).

Individual service publications do not provide much help for the conflict termination planner. The only publication that addresses the issue directly is the U.S. Army's keystone manual, FM 100-5, Operations.¹⁰ The manual emphasizes the importance of termination considerations, but only provides general overarching guidance on the subject.

Termination Considerations in Operational Art

Military theorists have pointed out the importance of conflict termination planning for centuries. Clausewitz stressed planning a military campaign to completion *from the beginning* in order to achieve political objectives.¹¹ Additionally, in his book on operational art used at the Naval War College, theorist Milan Vego emphasizes planning military operations oriented toward the desired end state. He stresses that this end state includes political, diplomatic, economic, and social conditions.¹²

These theorists and others like Sun Tzu¹³ all recognize that conflict termination deserves significant emphasis. Clausewitz even discusses creating those military conditions that will facilitate negotiations.¹⁴ His recommendation is incorporated into U.S. military termination doctrine in principle. Clausewitz also cautions against "overshooting the target" in military operations.¹⁵ In limited wars, combatant commanders must seek the appropriate culminating point to shape the environment for favorable peace terms.

Termination Shortfalls

What doctrine and military theorists fail to tell us is how to conduct successful termination planning. We get a sense that termination planning is vital and that it should be done from the very beginning. U.S. doctrine and theorists also tell us we must not only create military conditions favorable to peace, but should also ensure that political, economic and social circumstances are aligned to secure U.S. interests. However, these sources are silent in defining the pathway from war-winning to peace-winning.

That being the case, are most joint military staff members sufficiently trained in shaping the political, economic and social factors defined in the strategic end state? I think not. However, a number of U.S. agencies including the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the

Department of Commerce and the United States Agency for International Development have significant expertise to contribute to this effort. Geographic CINCs should create Operations

Transition Planning Cells within their Strategic Planning Directorate (J-5), recruiting as members representatives from the interagency community, for the purpose of deliberately designing transition strategies.

III. OPERATIONS TRANSITION PLANNING CELL (OTPC)

War involves in its progress such a train of unforeseen and unsupposed circumstances that no human wisdom can calculate the end. 16 -- Thomas Paine

Limited war is a complex undertaking involving numerous factors outside of the realm of military expertise. An interagency approach is needed to tackle this multi-dimensional, fluid environment. While CINCs coordinate in peacetime, all too often they only coordinate in the necessary depth with Ambassadors and Country Teams *after* the National Command Authorities (NCA) have decided to employ military means to settle an issue. If this interaction occurs at the beginning of military operations, why not all the way through? Just as each CINC has a planning group dedicated to deploying and employing joint military force, he should have a team dedicated to integrating the military instrument into the overall effort to win the peace.

The purpose of the Operations Transition Planning Cell is to assist the CINC in achieving U.S. political objectives given to him by the NCA. As an interagency group, the OTPC is organized for success. While the majority of the CINC's staff focuses solely on military matters, this team provides the CINC with recommendations on achieving favorable conditions in all power dimensions. Using the brain trust of his own OTPC, the CINC can interact with the NCA offering options throughout the course of a campaign. Since these options will come from diverse experts encompassing all policy instruments, they are likely to anticipate possible objections and therefore have added legitimacy with national security leaders.

OTPC Tasks

The OTPC has many assignments. I will discuss six of the most significant.

• Assisting with Desired End State Definition

After verifying the initial U.S. objectives, the first important OTPC task is to define the proposed desired end state. In some cases, this might mean taking the initiative in end state planning. Crises develop quickly and unexpectedly, and the NCA and national security team may not have time to fully define all of the desired end state elements. Operation Restore Hope, the 1992 MOOTW in Somalia, is a case in point. Here, a tactical planning staff had to assist the chain of command with desired end state planning with less than optimal results. ¹⁷ The creation of the OTPC would lift this additional burden from military operators and give desired end state definition the attention it demands. Such a process would encourage senior leaders to conduct serious deliberations on the subject and allow the rest of the CINC's planning staff to focus on deployment and initial employment of military forces.

• Defining Military Transition Conditions

After the initial desired end state delineation, the OTPC will assist in defining the military conditions that will lead to a successful transition to diplomatic leadership. These conditions will become the CINC's military objectives. In conjunction with military planners, the OTPC will advise the CINC on the appropriate ways and means to achieve these objectives. In developing the CINC's directives, the OTPC's role is to incorporate (and synchronize) all key dimensions into the plan: political, social, economic, diplomatic, military and informational.

Sequencing

Favorable transition conditions will take time to evolve. For this reason, the OTPC is next tasked with developing a sequenced path to the military transition state. The path may be a series of

phases where the generation of specific circumstances may signal the end of one phase and the beginning of the next. An example of a tool that the OTPC could use for phased transition state planning was developed by Bruce B.G. Clarke. His hypothetical synchronization matrix applied to the Somalia MOOTW could be tailored to any crisis. In the matrix, Clarke shows the planned status of variables like command and control, security, economy and diplomacy by operational phase. The operation moves to the next phase when each variable meets the tripwire definition described in the matrix.

When circumstances in some variables match favorable transition conditions, the OTPC should advise the CINC on how to maintain this preferred state in order to progress toward successful hand-off. Ideally, when *all* transition conditions are met, the CINC is ready to hand-off leadership to diplomats.

• Monitoring, Assessing and Recommending Changes to Strategy

During the course of military operations, changes are inevitable. Political aims may change, the desired end state may be modified, and conditions that lead to success may vary. For this reason, the OTPC has an important monitoring and assessment role. The OTPC deliberates strategy and the consequences of military actions. The OTPC should advise the CINC on when and how to modify his approach to the conflict.

To correctly evaluate conditions, the OTPC needs to continually revise their net assessment, taking full account of economic, social, psychological and diplomatic aspects of the situation. The OTPC must be integrated into all available theater informational resources. As battlespace awareness increases, the OTPC advises the CINC on ways to calibrate objectives and refine strategy. As components of strategy change, the CINC can then provide higher quality feedback to national leaders on the implications of altered strategy.

• Developing Contingencies

During the planning of a major joint operation, the J-5 develops branches and sequels to the base plan. Similarly, the OTPC must develop offshoots and follow-on activities that will lead to peace-winning. As branches and sequels often develop through wargaming, the OTPC members need to "what-if" the consequences of a CINC's strategy on existing economic, diplomatic, informational and social circumstances. Wargaming done by interagency experts will lead to viable additional options for the CINC. This activity will increase the unified commander's agility.

• Leading the Transition

Eventually, as the military transition state approaches, a hand-off to diplomatic leaders will occur. The OTPC should play the lead role in planning this transition. Functional OTPC experts will coordinate with their counterparts from the Country Teams to ensure a smooth changeover.

The OTPC should play a vital role in determining the size and roles of military forces in post-hostility operations. If transition occurs prior to achieving all military objectives, the OTPC must provide diplomats with a list of unfulfilled military conditions to negotiate.

OTPC Organization

Given that a JTF commander's concern will be to ensure unity of effort, too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors...¹⁹

LTG Schroeder, commander of JTF Support Hope, made this comment, which appears in Chapter III of Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. He was emphasizing the challenge of forming interagency teams while simultaneously conducting fast-paced military operations. A way to alleviate some of the additional burden would be to have a strong, previously-established interagency link prior to military commitment.

For this reason, the OTPC should be stood up in each geographic unified commander's Strategic Planning Directorate on a permanent basis. During peacetime engagement, the OTPC should be directly involved in strategic planning as well as political-military coordination. The OTPC could be used by the CINC to strengthen ties with other government agencies. The OTPC's military members would benefit as they become familiar with other agency techniques and practices. Transition planning exercises could be conducted separate from or in conjunction with major joint operations to provide the OTPC with experience in transition state planning. The OTPC could assist the CINC in directing his engagement plans to achieve national policy goals.

As crises erupt and CINCs form JTFs, the OTPC can assist the JTF plans cell as required. Functional experts from the CINC's OTPC would be available to act as planning liaisons with other U.S. agencies. Why not establish a JTF OTPC? This option is a possibility to consider, but it would do nothing to alleviate the challenges LTG Schroeder stated. Additionally, the JTF Commander is directly responsible to the regional CINC, not to the NCA. The OTPC is designed to provide a theater-to-national strategy link. Also, JTFs are often formed for short duration operations. By the time the JTF OTPC is created, trained and working, the operation may be nearly complete and many of the benefits of early transition planning would not be available. However, under certain circumstances such as the employment of a sizable JTF for a long duration, it might be wise to stand-up an additional OTPC.

OTPC Membership

Successful conflict termination requires integration of all the instruments of power.²⁰

As a strategic planning cell within the CINC's J-5, the OTPC should include functional experts from several national agencies. In addition to being experts in non-military instruments of power, these staff members should be formally trained in military decision making doctrine and

methodologies. The core of the OTPC should consist of no more than a dozen individuals, about half of these members being from non-Department of Defense agencies. Agencies that should contribute OTPC staffers include several bureaus from within the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce and the United States Agency for International Development.

Each CINC has his own Political Advisor (POLAD). The job of the POLAD is to advise the CINC on the foreign policy implications of his military responsibilities. The POLAD ensures military objectives are in harmony with political policy.²¹ The POLAD is involved in engagement and contingency planning.

The POLAD should have an OTPC planner assigned to his office with duty to the J-5. This foreign service official would be primarily responsible for the diplomatic aspects of transition state planning. He would be an expert in the political affairs of countries within the CINC's area of responsibility. During military commitment, this OTPC member would develop approaches that shape the political situation in the foreign state consistent with the NCA desired end state. He and the POLAD would act as diplomatic liaison to Country Teams and State Department leaders during military-dominant operations. This OTPC member would play a vital role in assisting the CINC with conducting negotiations, if the CINC is called upon to do so as General Schwarzkopf was in Desert Storm.

A member of the State Department's International Information Programs (IIP) bureau should also be assigned to each CINC's OTPC. The IIP is the former United States Information Service and has the mission to promote foreign understanding and acceptance of U.S. policies.²² The IIP operates internationally managing press strategies and providing audiences with accurate information about the U.S. The IIP representative would work closely with a CINC's Public

Diplomacy Advisor. The IIP representative's focus would be assisting in planning the information operation's component of a CINC's strategy. Using his host nation and regional contacts, the IIP OTPC representative would provide the J-5 with information on foreign attitudes and trends. This information would be used to adjust features of the CINC's strategy to gain support for U.S. objectives. This staffer would also be used to devise methods for countering the enemy's propaganda campaign, allowing the U.S. to maintain the initiative in the information operations arena.

The OTPC needs membership from national intelligence agencies. As the lead U.S. intelligence organization outside of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency should provide a representative on the OTPC. The role of the CIA planner would be twofold: to provide strategic-level intelligence analysis and to provide covert action planning recommendations.

The CIA representative would assist joint military intelligence planners with the estimate of the situation. While military planners focus on possible enemy military courses of action, the CIA representative would look at all enemy instruments and how they could be applied to defeat the U.S. military operation. This OTPC member would provide the CINC with military and non-military options for countering enemy strategies and shaping conditions to affect conflict resolution.

The CIA representative may need intelligence planning support. If that is the case, the OTPC may require augmentation from other specialized intelligence agencies. A National Intelligence Planning Team (NIPT) should be formed. The NIPT would function much like a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST), however the focus of the NIPT is strategic planning for transition operations and it could be smaller than a full-up NIST.

CINCs also have economic experts. These advisors provide economic engagement and deliberate planning recommendations to the CINC's joint staff. Since economics is such a crucial

instrument of national power, the OTPC needs specialists on his staff. To bolster the CINC's assigned experts, a representative from the USAID should be assigned to the OTPC. The USAID has the mission to assist foreign governments with economic growth, political freedom and good governance. The agency is a primary player in U.S. government foreign disaster relief efforts.²³ As such, officials from this agency assigned to a CINC's planning directorate would be especially suited for conflict resolution MOOTWs.

An official from the Department of Commerce should be part of the OTPC. This agency is actively involved in promoting U.S. economic interests abroad.²⁴ The Commerce member could assist transition planning by recommending trade and market access components to conflict resolution strategies. During limited wars, the USAID and Commerce experts would have a large role in planning the post-hostilities, or post-transition, phase of military operations.

Like the CINC's Operations Planning Group, The OTPC needs military representatives from throughout the CINC's major staff directorates. The chairman of the OTPC should be one of the deputy J-5s responsible for deliberate planning. As such, this individual should receive formal training in interagency operations. Training can be integrated into the curriculum at institutions like the National Defense University and civilian institutions like the Kennedy School of Government and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Members chosen from State, Commerce, CIA and USAID could also be sent to these schools for short courses on conflict termination and transition planning. Here they would also learn the basics of joint military decision-making.

The OTPC should be an organization that has a standard nucleus consisting of those members discussed above. The CINC and his key subordinates can (and should) recommend changes to the OTPC. The OTPC will be a dynamic organization with complete membership dependent on the specific contingency. During multi-national operations, for instance, planners

from other nations may be included. During some types of MOOTW, it might be appropriate to seek advice from non-governmental or private volunteer organizations for use in transition planning. Extending invitations to members outside the U.S. federal government would produce additional challenges for the OTPC. For instance, access to some sources of intelligence would be restricted. Nonetheless, in UN and coalition operations, the benefits of a long-term, collective approach may outweigh the constraints. Furthermore, for political reasons, the CINC may not have a choice but to accept foreign augmentation. However, the core of the OTPC should work together on a routine basis to develop as an effective planning team.

OTPC Implementation

The fact is that of the three categories of the spectrum of conflict (Deter, Fight, Terminate), war termination has been virtually ignored. In our fascination with the means of strategy, we have neglected the study of its ends - those objects that will lead directly to peace. ²⁵

In the quote above, COL Harry Summers affirms what I have discussed above. Joint doctrine lacks techniques for conducting conflict transition planning. A new joint publication is needed to fill this gap. Using Joint Pub 3.0 as motivation, and Joint Pub 5.0 as a foundation for general planning, the new publication should outline how interagency transition planning should be done. Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Planning, contains some good interagency information that should be incorporated into the new transition planning pub.

Before a publication can be developed, the operations transition doctrine needs to be developed. Operational planning concepts already in use like the commander's estimate of the situation can be modified to provide the basis for the new doctrine. Planners from the State Department, the CIA and other U.S. agencies should be consulted as doctrine is advanced. Theorists and scholars at the nation's senior military colleges should provide recommendations.

The U.S. military must make a concerted effort to fill this void. We are the best war fighters in the world. Let's invest the energy required to become better peace planners.

We need not wait for a joint publication to stand-up the Operations Transition Planning

Cells. A "beta-OTPC" should be organized now in one of the geographic CINC headquarters. This

trial OTPC could be put through intensive exercises and wargames designed to determine the

appropriate interagency organization. The beta-OTPC could also develop and explore the use of

different tools for conducting transition planning. After testing, a validated "fielding version" of the

OTPC could then be stood-up in all geographic CINC J-5's.

Counterarguments

Some might argue that permanently assigning representatives of other federal agencies to a joint military headquarters is not needed. What will suffice is a good doctrine with some interagency exercises and conferences to affect the same quality solutions or protocols. I disagree. Transition planning is not a science. Although doctrine is a good guide, no formulas exist that will always lead to a favorable conflict resolution. The art of planning military operations requires close coordination from a staff that is accustomed to working together all the time. Why should transition planning be any easier? If anything, transition strategies are more difficult, because they must incorporate all instruments of national power in a coherent, synchronized fashion.

Others might question the benefit of the OTPC to federal agencies asked to provide representatives. Why should these agencies provide representatives to the CINC's OTPC? Firstly, during conflicts, all instruments of national power are focused on achieving the desired end state. Although not the dominant player, agencies like State, CIA, USAID and Commerce are accountable for components of the national grand strategy during major military operations. The need for closer interagency cooperation during complex contingencies to achieve durable peace and stability is

explicitly stated in Presidential Decision Directive-56, a Clinton Administration White Paper. ²⁶
The OTPC exists to achieve a plan that integrates all power mechanisms. This integrated approach can also be extended to peacetime engagement strategies achieving greater efficiencies.

Additionally, the OTPC provides other agencies a forum for their ideas and recommendations.

OTPC members can advocate agency programs *from the inside* during military operations, as opposed to from the outside, which is the current model. Thirdly, OTPC membership would allow resource-strapped agencies access to military assets. These assets could be utilized to carry out multi-agency tasks in support of U.S. foreign policy goals.

IV. CONCLUSION

The object of war is a better peace...Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. ²⁷ -- Liddell Hart

The future application of military power is likely to be within the context of a limited war or MOOTW. These environments are complex and filled with uncertainty and constraints. If we commit the military to protecting U.S. interests, we should do so with a clear strategy for winning the peace through successful transition planning.

The military must shift focus from military termination to military transition. To make this adjustment, our mindset needs to change. Sustaining our joint war fighting expertise is critical, but we must improve our interagency coordination efforts throughout military-dominant operations.

The OTPC, or an organization with a different name but similar purpose, is a step in the right direction. By creating this organization with an accompanying doctrine, we can avoid stumbling into peacemaking and successfully achieve the political objectives we were tasked to accomplish.

NOTES

- 1. Fred Charles Ikle', Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 2.
- 2. John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the Gap, and Things that Go Bump in the Night," <u>Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement</u>, Vol 4, No. 3 (Winter 1995): 393.
- 3. <u>Planning and Execution of Conflict Termination</u> (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air Command and Staff College, 1995), 94.
- 4. James W. Reed, "Should Deterrrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning," Parameters (Summer 1993): 46.
- 5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 1 Feb 1995), I-9.
- 6. Ibid., III-2.
- 7. Ibid., I-10.
- 8. Number of hits determined using a word-processing search of the entire document. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</u>, Joint Pub 5-0 (Washington, DC: 13 April 1995).
- 9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia</u> (Washington, DC: 16 July 1997), 683-688.
- 10. U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Operations</u>, FM 100-5 (Washington, DC: June 1993), 6-23.
- 11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.
- 12. Milan Vego, On Operational Art (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999), 345.
- 13. Sun Tzu's advice was to terminate war quickly. He counseled against protracted war. Sun Tzu, <u>The Art of War</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 73.
- 14. Clausewitz, 81.
- 15. Ibid., 570.

- 16. Charles M. Westenhoff, Military Air Power: The CADRE Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1990), 60.
- 17. S. L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," <u>Military Review</u> (December 1993): 34.
- 18. Bruce B.G. Clarke, "End-State Planning: The Somalia Case," in <u>Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success</u>, ed. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 55.
- 19. LTG Daniel Schroeder, <u>Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 Oct 1996), III-1.
- 20. Planning and Execution of Conflict Termination, 90.
- 21. "Office of the Foreign Policy Advisor," <u>USCINCPAC Homepage</u>, 29 November 2000, http://www.pacom.mil [15 December 2000].
- 22. "About the Office of International Information Programs," <u>U.S. Department of State Webpage</u>, http://usinfo.state.gov/abtusia/aboutiip.htm [3 Jan 2001].
- 23. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-08 (Washington, DC: 9 Oct 1996), A-M-1.
- 24. "Trade Development", <u>International Trade Administration</u>, <u>U.S. Department of Commerce</u>, http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/td_home/about.html, 27 January 2001.
- 25. Harry G. Summers, Jr., "War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace," Naval War College Review (Jan-Feb 1986): 19.
- 26. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive-56," Thoughtlink, Inc. Webpage, 17 September 1999, http://www.pdd56.com/handbook docs/appendix_A.htm [27 January 2000].
- 27. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Meridan, 1991), 338.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "About the Office of International Information Programs." <u>U.S. Department of State Webpage</u>. http://usinfo.state.gov/abtusia/aboutiip.htm [3 Jan 2001].
- Arnold, S. L. "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War." Military Review (December 1993): 26-35.
- Clarke, Bruce B.G. "End-State Planning: The Somalia Case." In Managing

 <u>Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success</u>, edited by Max G. Manwaring and
 William J. Olson, 49-69. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive-56." National Security Council. 17 September 1999. http://www.pdd56.com/handbook_docs/appendix_A.htm [27 January 2000].
- Fishel, John T. "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the Gap, and Things that Go Bump in the Night." Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol 4, No. 3 (Winter 1995): 372-398.
- Gilpin, Michael D. COL. "Exit Strategy: The New Dimension in Operational Planning." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1997.
- Goodman, Allan E. and Sandra C. Bogart, eds. <u>Making Peace: The United States and Conflict Resolution</u>. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992.
- Ikle', Fred Charles. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy. New York: Meridan, 1991.
- <u>Planning and Execution of Conflict Termination</u>. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University. Air Command and Staff College, 1995.
- Reed, James W. "Should Deterrrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning." <u>Parameters</u> (Summer 1993): 41-52.
- Soucy, Robert R. LtCol, MAJ Kevin A. Shwedo and MAJ John S. Haven II. "War Termination Criteria and JOPES: A Dangerous Omission in U.S. Crisis Action Planning." 25 March 1994. <u>Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM</u>. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2000.

- Summers, COL Harry G. Jr. "War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace." Naval War College Review (Jan-Feb 1986): 18-29.
- Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- "Trade Development". International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/td_home/about.html [27 January 2001].
- <u>USCINCPAC Homepage</u>. 29 November 2000. http://www.pacom.mil [15 December 2000].
- U.S. Department of the Army. <u>Operations</u>. FM 100-5. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC: 1993.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>. Joint Pub 3-0. Washington, DC: 1 February 1995.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. <u>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</u>. Joint Pub 5-0. Washington, DC: 13 April 1995.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. <u>Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations</u>. Joint Pub 3-08. Washington, DC: 9 October 1996.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia. Washington, DC: 16 July 1997.
- Vego, Milan. Operational Art. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999.
- Westenhoff, Charles M. Military Air Power: The CADRE Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1990.